We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several... (more)
In the setting where information cannot be verified, we propose a simple yet powerful information... (more)
Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-k-counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules. We characterize SNTV,... (more)
We do a game-theoretic analysis of leader election, under the assumption that each agent prefers to have some leader than no leader at all. We show that it is possible to obtain a fair Nash equilibrium, where each agent has an equal probability of being elected leader, in a completely connected network, in a bidirectional ring, and a unidirectional... (more)
David Pennock and Ilya Segal took over as co-Editors-in-Chief in March 2017.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) is a journal focusing on the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: read more
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