ACM Transactions on

Economics and Computation (TEAC)

Latest Articles

Introduction to the Special Issue on EC’15

Leximin Allocations in the Real World

As part of a collaboration with a major California school district, we study the problem of fairly allocating unused classrooms in public schools to charter schools. Our approach revolves around the randomized leximin mechanism. We extend previous work to show that the leximin mechanism is proportional, envy-free, Pareto optimal, and group... (more)

Private Pareto Optimal Exchange

We consider the problem of implementing an individually rational, asymptotically Pareto optimal allocation in a barter-exchange economy where agents are endowed with goods and preferences over the goods of others, but may not use money as a medium of exchange. Because one of the most important instantiations of such economies is kidney... (more)

Learning What’s Going on: Reconstructing Preferences and Priorities from Opaque Transactions

We consider a setting where n buyers, with combinatorial preferences over m items, and a seller, running a priority-based allocation mechanism, repeatedly interact. Our goal, from observing limited information about the results of these interactions, is to reconstruct both the preferences of the buyers and the mechanism of the seller. More... (more)

Allocation with Traffic Spikes: Mixing Adversarial and Stochastic Models

Motivated by Internet advertising applications, online allocation problems have been studied extensively in various adversarial and stochastic models. While the adversarial arrival models are too pessimistic, many of the stochastic (such as i.i.d. or random-order) arrival models do not realistically capture uncertainty in predictions. A significant... (more)

Integrating Market Makers, Limit Orders, and Continuous Trade in Prediction Markets

We provide the first concrete algorithm for combining market makers and limit orders in a prediction market with continuous trade. Our mechanism is... (more)

Near-Optimum Online Ad Allocation for Targeted Advertising

Motivated by Internet targeted advertising, we address several ad allocation problems. Prior work has established that these problems admit no... (more)

Team Performance with Test Scores

Team performance is a ubiquitous area of inquiry in the social sciences, and it motivates the problem of team selection—choosing the members of a team for maximum performance. Influential work of Hong and Page has argued that testing individuals in isolation and then assembling the highest scoring ones into a team is not an effective method... (more)

Public Projects, Boolean Functions, and the Borders of Border’s Theorem

Border’s theorem gives an intuitive linear characterization of the feasible interim allocation rules of a Bayesian single-item environment,... (more)

Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity

We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items... (more)

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints

We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the... (more)


New Editors-In-Chief

David Pennock and Ilya Segal took over as co-Editors-in-Chief in March 2017.

About TEAC

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) is a journal focusing on the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: read more

Forthcoming Articles

An Information Theoretic Framework For Designing Information Elicitation Mechanisms That Reward Truth-telling

Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy

Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions

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