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The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare

The maximum Nash welfare (MNW) solution—which selects an allocation that maximizes the product of utilities—is known to provide... (more)

The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Pro-sociality can be Well Predicted Using Payoffs and Three Behavioral Types

The human willingness to pay costs to benefit anonymous others is often explained by social preferences: rather than only valuing their own material payoff, people also include the payoffs of others in their utility function. But how successful is this concept of outcome-based social preferences for actually predicting out-of-sample behavior? We... (more)

Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups

Exclusive social groups are ones in which the group members decide whether or not to admit a candidate to the group. Examples of exclusive social groups include academic departments and fraternal organizations. In this article, we introduce an analytic framework for studying the dynamics of exclusive social groups. In our model, every group member... (more)

Dynamic Taxes for Polynomial Congestion Games

We consider the efficiency of taxation in congestion games with polynomial latency functions along the line of research initiated by Caragiannis et al. [ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 2010], who focused on both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in games with affine latencies only. By exploiting the primal-dual method [Bilò, Proceedings of the... (more)

The Stochastic Matching Problem with (Very) Few Queries

Motivated by an application in kidney exchange, we study the following stochastic matching problem: We are given a graph G(V, E) (not necessarily... (more)

Minimizing Regret with Multiple Reserves

We study the problem of computing and learning non-anonymous reserve prices to maximize revenue. We first define the Maximizing Multiple Reserves (MMR) problem in single-parameter matroid environments, where the input is m valuation profiles v1,…,vm, indexed by the same n bidders, and the goal is to compute the vector r of (non-anonymous)... (more)

NEWS

New Editors-In-Chief

David Pennock and Ilya Segal took over as co-Editors-in-Chief in March 2017.


About TEAC

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) is a journal focusing on the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: read more

Forthcoming Articles

The Better Half of Selling Separately

Dynamic Matching and Allocation of Tasks


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