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Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue

We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several... (more)

An Information Theoretic Framework For Designing Information Elicitation Mechanisms That Reward Truth-telling

In the setting where information cannot be verified, we propose a simple yet powerful information... (more)

Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy

Committee scoring voting rules are multiwinner analogues of positional scoring rules, which constitute an important subclass of single-winner voting rules. We identify several natural subclasses of committee scoring rules, namely, weakly separable, representation-focused, top-k-counting, OWA-based, and decomposable rules. We characterize SNTV,... (more)

Distributed Protocols for Leader Election: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

We do a game-theoretic analysis of leader election, under the assumption that each agent prefers to have some leader than no leader at all. We show that it is possible to obtain a fair Nash equilibrium, where each agent has an equal probability of being elected leader, in a completely connected network, in a bidirectional ring, and a unidirectional... (more)

NEWS

New Editors-In-Chief

David Pennock and Ilya Segal took over as co-Editors-in-Chief in March 2017.


About TEAC

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) is a journal focusing on the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: read more

Forthcoming Articles

Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud

Bid-Limited Targeting

Fractional Hedonic Games

The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. Fractional hedonic games thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games, but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of fractional hedonic games is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core.


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