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Bid-Limited Targeting

This article analyzes a mechanism for selling items in auctions in which the auctioneer specifies a cap on the ratio between the maximum and minimum bids that bidders may use in the auctions. Such a mechanism is widely used in online advertising through the caps that companies impose on the minimum and maximum bid multipliers that advertisers may... (more)

Fractional Hedonic Games

The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to... (more)

Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud

The problem of pricing the cloud has attracted much recent attention due to the widespread use of cloud computing and cloud services. From a theoretical perspective, several mechanisms that provide strong efficiency or fairness guarantees and desirable incentive properties have been designed. However, these mechanisms often rely on a rigid model,... (more)

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New Editors-In-Chief

David Pennock and Ilya Segal took over as co-Editors-in-Chief in March 2017.


About TEAC

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) is a journal focusing on the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: read more

Forthcoming Articles

Earning and Utility Limits in Fisher Markets

Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games

Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting

We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this setting, which we call ``Knapsack Voting''. We study its strategic properties - we show that it is strategy-proof under a natural model of utility (a dis-utility given by the $\ell_1$ distance between the outcome and the true preference of the voter), and ``partially" strategy-proof under general additive utilities. We extend Knapsack Voting to more general settings with revenues, deficits or surpluses, and prove a similar strategy-proofness result. To further demonstrate the applicability of our scheme, we discuss its implementation on a digital voting platform that we have deployed in many cities across the nation by partnering with local government bodies. From voting data thus collected, we present empirical evidence that Knapsack Voting works well in practice.


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