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Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions
Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
Article No.: 5
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions, the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. For...
We model and analyze cardinal contests, where a principal running a rank-order tournament has access to an absolute measure of the quality of agents’ submissions in addition to their relative rankings. We show that a mechanism that...
The Value of Privacy: Strategic Data Subjects, Incentive Mechanisms, and Fundamental Limits
Weina Wang, Lei Ying, Junshan Zhang
Article No.: 8
We study the value of data privacy in a game-theoretic model of trading private data, where a data collector purchases private data from strategic data subjects (individuals) through an incentive mechanism. One primary goal of the data collector...