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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) - Special Issue on Wine'15, Volume 5 Issue 4, December 2017

Section: SPECIAL ISSUE ON WINE'15

Applications of α-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions
Richard Cole, Shravas Rao
Article No.: 18
DOI: 10.1145/3157083

Two classes of distributions that are widely used in the analysis of Bayesian auctions are the monotone hazard rate (MHR) and regular distributions. They can both be characterized in terms of the rate of change of the associated virtual value...

Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction
Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li, Rakesh Vohra
Article No.: 20
DOI: 10.1145/3084358

A classical trading experiment consists of a set of unit demand buyers and unit supply sellers with identical items. Each agent’s value or opportunity cost for the item is his private information, and preferences are quasilinear. Trade...

Impartial Selection and the Power of Up to Two Choices
Antje Bjelde, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
Article No.: 21
DOI: 10.1145/3107922

We study mechanisms that select members of a set of agents based on nominations by other members and that are impartial in the sense that agents cannot influence their own chance of selection. Prior work has shown that deterministic mechanisms for...

Sequential Posted-Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations
Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart De Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi
Article No.: 22
DOI: 10.1145/3157085

We study the revenue performance of sequential posted-price mechanisms and some natural extensions for a setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correlated distribution. Sequential posted-price mechanisms are conceptually...

The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou
Article No.: 19
DOI: 10.1145/3105968

We study the problem of scheduling m tasks to n selfish, unrelated machines in order to minimize the makespan, in which the execution times are independent random variables, identical across machines. We show that the VCG mechanism,...

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games
Branislav Bošanský, Simina Brânzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Troels Bjerre Lund, Peter Bro Miltersen
Article No.: 23
DOI: 10.1145/3133242

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the...