Economics and Computation (TEAC)


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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 5 Issue 2, March 2017

Farewell Editorial: Looking Back on Our Terms Editing ACM TEAC and into the Future
Vincent Conitzer, Preston McAfee
Article No.: 9e
DOI: 10.1145/3079047

Editorial from the New TEAC Co-Editors-in-Chief
David Pennock, Ilya Segal
Article No.: 9ee
DOI: 10.1145/3084545

Computing Dominance-Based Solution Concepts
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill
Article No.: 9
DOI: 10.1145/2963093

Two common criticisms of Nash equilibrium are its dependence on very demanding epistemic assumptions and its computational intractability. We study the computational properties of less demanding set-valued solution concepts that are based on...

An Antifolk Theorem for Large Repeated Games
Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth, Jonathan Ullman
Article No.: 10
DOI: 10.1145/2976734

In this article, we study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems showing that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition known as (ε, γ)-differential privacy,...

Distributed Matching with Mixed Maximum-Minimum Utilities
Amos Azaria, David Sarne, Yonatan Aumann
Article No.: 11
DOI: 10.1145/3038911

In this article, we study distributed agent matching with search friction in environments characterized by costly exploration, where each agent’s utility from forming a partnership is influenced by some linear combination of the maximum and...

Provision-After-Wait with Common Preferences
Hau Chan, Jing Chen, Gowtham Srinivasan
Article No.: 12
DOI: 10.1145/3038910

In this article, we study the Provision-after-Wait problem in healthcare (Braverman, Chen, and Kannan, 2016). In this setting, patients seek a medical procedure that can be performed by different hospitals of different costs. Each patient has a...

Posting Prices with Unknown Distributions
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Shaddin Dughmi, Yaron Singer
Article No.: 13
DOI: 10.1145/3037382

We consider a dynamic auction model, where bidders sequentially arrive to the market. The values of the bidders for the item for sale are independently drawn from a distribution, but this distribution is unknown to the seller. The seller...