Economics and Computation (TEAC)


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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) - Special Issue on EC'13, Volume 4 Issue 3, June 2016

Section: Special Issue on EC'13

Preston Mcafee, Éva Tardos
Article No.: 12
DOI: 10.1145/2916701

Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy
Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil Vadhan
Article No.: 13
DOI: 10.1145/2892555

Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players’ utility functions (and doing so has...

Whole-Page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders
Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Qiqi Yan
Article No.: 14
DOI: 10.1145/2892563

In the context of online ad serving, display ads may appear on different types of webpages, where each page includes several ad slots and therefore multiple ads can be shown on each page. The set of ads that can be assigned to ad...

When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth?
Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah
Article No.: 15
DOI: 10.1145/2892565

A well-studied approach to the design of voting rules views them as maximum likelihood estimators; given votes that are seen as noisy estimates of a true ranking of the alternatives, the rule must reconstruct the most likely true ranking. We argue...

Incentives, Gamification, and Game Theory: An Economic Approach to Badge Design
David Easley, Arpita Ghosh
Article No.: 16
DOI: 10.1145/2910575

Gamification is growing increasingly prevalent as a means to incentivize user engagement of social media sites that rely on user contributions. Badges, or equivalent rewards, such as top-contributor lists that are used to recognize a user's...

Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored Search Auctions
Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key
Article No.: 17
DOI: 10.1145/2910576

In a sponsored search auction, decisions about how to rank ads impose tradeoffs between objectives, such as revenue and welfare. In this article, we examine how these tradeoffs should be made. We begin by arguing that the most natural solution...

Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Article No.: 18
DOI: 10.1145/2910577

We study interdependent value settings and extend several results from the well-studied independent private values model to these settings. For revenue-optimal mechanism design, we give conditions under which Myerson's virtual value-based...