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We study the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for selling nonexcludable public goods. In particular, we study revenue-maximizing mechanisms in Bayesian settings for facility location problems on graphs where no agent can be excluded from...
Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players
Hadi Minooei, Chaitanya Swamy
Article No.: 19
We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may be correlated, and the...
Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design
Dimitris Fotakis, Emmanouil Zampetakis
Article No.: 20
In this work, we investigate the reasons that make symmetric partial verification essentially useless in virtually all domains. Departing from previous work, we consider any possible (finite or infinite) domain and general symmetric verification....
Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games
Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden
Article No.: 21
Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the existence of and convergence of natural dynamics to a pure Nash equilibrium....
We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In...
The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces
Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb
Article No.: 23
The cake-cutting setting, in which a single heterogeneous good must be divided between multiple parties with different tastes, is a classic model for studying questions regarding fairness in resource allocation. In this work, we turn our attention...
Subsidized Prediction Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Agents
Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, Marina A. Epelman
Article No.: 24
In this article, we study the design and characterization of sequential prediction mechanisms in the presence of agents with unknown risk aversion. We formulate a collection of desirable properties for any sequential forecasting mechanism. We...
Socially-Optimal Design of Service Exchange Platforms with Imperfect Monitoring
Yuanzhang Xiao, Mihaela Van Der Schaar
Article No.: 25
We study the design of service exchange platforms in which long-lived anonymous users exchange services with each other. The users are randomly and repeatedly matched into pairs of clients and servers, and each server can choose to provide...
Affine Maximizers in Domains with Selfish Valuations
Swaprava Nath, Arunava Sen
Article No.: 26
We consider the domain of selfish and continuous preferences over a “rich” allocation space and show that onto, strategyproof and allocation non-bossy social choice functions are affine maximizers. Roberts ...