Economics and Computation (TEAC)


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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 2 Issue 4, October 2014

Near-Optimality in Covering Games by Exposing Global Information
Maria-Florina Balcan, Sara Krehbiel, Georgios Piliouras, Jinwoo Shin
Article No.: 13
DOI: 10.1145/2597890

Mechanism design for distributed systems is fundamentally concerned with aligning individual incentives with social welfare to avoid socially inefficient outcomes that can arise from agents acting autonomously. One simple and natural approach is...

Weighted Congestion Games: The Price of Anarchy, Universal Worst-Case Examples, and Tightness
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Martin Gairing, Tim Roughgarden
Article No.: 14
DOI: 10.1145/2629666

We characterize the Price of Anarchy (POA) in weighted congestion games, as a function of the allowable resource cost functions. Our results provide as thorough an understanding of this quantity as is already known for nonatomic and unweighted...

On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games
Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos
Article No.: 15
DOI: 10.1145/2665005

We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a metric space and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of...

Implementation and Computation of a Value for Generalized Characteristic Function Games
Tomasz P. Michalak, Piotr L. Szczepański, Talal Rahwan, Agata Chrobak, Simina Brânzei, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R. Jennings
Article No.: 16
DOI: 10.1145/2665007

Generalized characteristic function games are a variation of characteristic function games, in which the value of a coalition depends not only on the identities of its members, but also on the order in which the coalition is formed. This...

Altruism and Its Impact on the Price of Anarchy
Po-An Chen, Bart De Keijzer, David Kempe, Guido Schäfer
Article No.: 17
DOI: 10.1145/2597893

We study the inefficiency of equilibria for congestion games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of αi times his direct...