enter search term and/or author name
We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for two identical items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to analyze this setting for a simple, yet highly interesting, AND-OR game, where one agent is single minded and the other...
On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier
Article No.: 2
We study mechanisms for the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special case of s-CAs, where agents are...
Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
Tobias Harks, Philipp Von Falkenhausen
Article No.: 3
We introduce a quantitative approach to comparative statics that allows to bound the maximum effect of an exogenous parameter change on a system’s equilibrium. The motivation for this approach is a well-known paradox in multimarket Cournot...
In second-price auctions, we find that improved targeting via enhanced information disclosure decreases revenue when there are two bidders and increases revenue if there are at least four symmetric bidders with values drawn from a distribution...
Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty
Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova, Jeff S. Shamma
Article No.: 5
In game theory, the price of anarchy framework studies efficiency loss in decentralized environments. Optimization and decision theory, on the other hand, explore tradeoffs between optimality and robustness in the case of single-agent decision...
A Rational Convex Program for Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jugal Garg, László A. Végh
Article No.: 6
We present a new flow-type convex program describing equilibrium solutions to linear Arrow-Debreu markets. Whereas convex formulations were previously known ([Nenakov and Primak 1983; Jain 2007; Cornet 1989]), our program exhibits...
Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Allocation of Electric Power in Alternating Current Electric Systems for Smart Grid
Chi-Kin Chau, Khaled Elbassioni, Majid Khonji
Article No.: 7
Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints. The rise of smart grid presents a new class of auctions, characterized by quadratic constraints. This article studies the complex-demand knapsack problem,...
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing connection games. In these games, a graph with designated source s and sink t is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an...