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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 5 Issue 1, November 2016

The AND-OR Game
Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan
Article No.: 1
DOI: 10.1145/2897186

We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for two identical items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to analyze this setting for a simple, yet highly interesting, AND-OR game, where one agent is single minded and the other...

On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier
Article No.: 2
DOI: 10.1145/2956585

We study mechanisms for the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special case of s-CAs, where agents are...

Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox
Tobias Harks, Philipp Von Falkenhausen
Article No.: 3
DOI: 10.1145/2956580

We introduce a quantitative approach to comparative statics that allows to bound the maximum effect of an exogenous parameter change on a system’s equilibrium. The motivation for this approach is a well-known paradox in multimarket Cournot...

When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue?
Patrick Hummel, R. Preston Mcafee
Article No.: 4
DOI: 10.1145/2956586

In second-price auctions, we find that improved targeting via enhanced information disclosure decreases revenue when there are two bidders and increases revenue if there are at least four symmetric bidders with values drawn from a distribution...

Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty
Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova, Jeff S. Shamma
Article No.: 5
DOI: 10.1145/2930956

In game theory, the price of anarchy framework studies efficiency loss in decentralized environments. Optimization and decision theory, on the other hand, explore tradeoffs between optimality and robustness in the case of single-agent decision...

A Rational Convex Program for Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jugal Garg, László A. Végh
Article No.: 6
DOI: 10.1145/2930658

We present a new flow-type convex program describing equilibrium solutions to linear Arrow-Debreu markets. Whereas convex formulations were previously known ([Nenakov and Primak 1983; Jain 2007; Cornet 1989]), our program exhibits...

Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Allocation of Electric Power in Alternating Current Electric Systems for Smart Grid
Chi-Kin Chau, Khaled Elbassioni, Majid Khonji
Article No.: 7
DOI: 10.1145/2955089

Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints. The rise of smart grid presents a new class of auctions, characterized by quadratic constraints. This article studies the complex-demand knapsack problem,...

Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri
Article No.: 8
DOI: 10.1145/2955090

We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing connection games. In these games, a graph with designated source s and sink t is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an...