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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 4 Issue 1, December 2015

An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web
Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber
Article No.: 1
DOI: 10.1145/2716312

Auctions are widely used on the Web. Applications range from sponsored search to platforms such as eBay. In these and in many other applications the auctions in use are single-/multi-item auctions with unit demand. The main drawback of standard...

On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
Article No.: 2
DOI: 10.1145/2818357

We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are...

Auctioning Time: Truthful Auctions of Heterogeneous Divisible Goods
Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb, Avinatan Hassidim
Article No.: 3
DOI: 10.1145/2833086

We consider the problem of auctioning time - a one-dimensional continuously-divisible heterogeneous good - among multiple agents. Applications include auctioning time for using a shared device, auctioning TV commercial slots, and more. Different...

Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits
Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger
Article No.: 4
DOI: 10.1145/2818351

We study individual rational, Pareto-optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. We consider settings with multiunit demand and additive valuations. For single-dimensional valuations we...

How to Put Through Your Agenda in Collective Binary Decisions
Noga Alon, Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Stefan Kratsch, Rolf Niedermeier, Gerhard J. Woeginger
Article No.: 5
DOI: 10.1145/2837467

We consider the following decision-making scenario: a society of voters has to find an agreement on a set of proposals, and every single proposal is to be accepted or rejected. Each voter supports a certain subset of the proposals—the...

Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas
Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo
Article No.: 6
DOI: 10.1145/2841226

We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable...