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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 3 Issue 3, June 2015

An Equilibrium Analysis of Scrip Systems
Ian A. Kash, Eric J. Friedman, Joseph Y. Halpern
Article No.: 13
DOI: 10.1145/2659006

A game-theoretic model of scrip (artificial currency) systems is analyzed. It is shown that relative entropy can be used to characterize the distribution of agent wealth when all agents use threshold strategies—that is, they volunteer...

Incentives in Large Random Two-Sided Markets
Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian
Article No.: 14
DOI: 10.1145/2656202

Many centralized two-sided markets form a matching between participants by running a stable matching algorithm. It is a well-known fact that no matching mechanism based on a stable matching algorithm can guarantee truthfulness as a dominant...

Display Advertising Auctions with Arbitrage
Ruggiero Cavallo, R. Preston Mcafee, Sergei Vassilvitskii
Article No.: 15
DOI: 10.1145/2668033

Online display advertising exchanges connect Web publishers with advertisers seeking to place ads. In many cases, the advertiser obtains value from an ad impression (a viewing by a user) only if it is clicked, and frequently advertisers prefer to...

Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games
Davide Bilò, Luciano Gualà, Guido Proietti
Article No.: 16
DOI: 10.1145/2770639

A network creation game simulates a decentralized and noncooperative construction of a communication network. Informally, there are n players sitting on the network nodes, which attempt to establish a reciprocal communication by...