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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) - Special Issue on EC'12, Part 1, Volume 3 Issue 1, March 2015

Introduction to the Special Issue on EC’12
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Panos Ipeirotis
Article No.: 1
DOI: 10.1145/2742678

Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure
Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, Alexander Skopalik
Article No.: 2
DOI: 10.1145/2614687

We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by a potential function...

Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness: Extensions, Limitations, and Indivisibilities
David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah
Article No.: 3
DOI: 10.1145/2739040

We study the problem of allocating multiple resources to agents with heterogeneous demands. Technological advances such as cloud computing and data centers provide a new impetus for investigating this problem under the assumption that agents...

Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply
Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins
Article No.: 4
DOI: 10.1145/2559152

We consider the problem of designing revenue-maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers (“agents”) that are...

Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes
Article No.: 5
DOI: 10.1145/2559049

In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret, we are...

The Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information
Tim Roughgarden
Article No.: 6
DOI: 10.1145/2737816

We define smooth games of incomplete information. We prove an ’’extension theorem” for such games:price of anarchy bounds for pure Nash equilibria for all induced full-information games extendautomatically, without quantitative...