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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 2 Issue 2, June 2014

Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato PaesLeme, Moshe Tennenholtz
Article No.: 5
DOI: 10.1145/2594564

Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study of...

Eliciting Predictions and Recommendations for Decision Making
Yiling Chen, Ian A. Kash, Michael Ruberry, Victor Shnayder
Article No.: 6
DOI: 10.1145/2556271

When making a decision, a decision maker selects one of several possible actions and hopes to achieve a desirable outcome. To make a better decision, the decision maker often asks experts for advice. In this article, we consider two methods of...

Ex-Post Equilibrium and VCG Mechanisms
Rakefet Rozen, Rann Smorodinsky
Article No.: 7
DOI: 10.1145/2594565

Consider an abstract social choice setting with incomplete information, where the number of alternatives is large. Albeit natural, implementing VCG mechanisms is infeasible due to the prohibitive communication constraints. However, if players...

The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing is Two
Xujin Chen, Benjamin Doerr, Carola Doerr, Xiaodong Hu, Weidong Ma, Rob van Stee
Article No.: 8
DOI: 10.1145/2548545

We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that the...