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ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 1 Issue 4, December 2013

Approximate Mechanism Design without Money
Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
Article No.: 18
DOI: 10.1145/2542174.2542175

The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms cannot be applied efficiently. Recent years have seen the design of various...

Binary Opinion Dynamics with Stubborn Agents
Ercan Yildiz, Asuman Ozdaglar, Daron Acemoglu, Amin Saberi, Anna Scaglione
Article No.: 19
DOI: 10.1145/2538508

We study binary opinion dynamics in a social network with stubborn agents who influence others but do not change their opinions. We focus on a generalization of the classical voter model by introducing nodes (stubborn agents) that have a...

Making Consensus Tractable
Elchanan Mossel, Omer Tamuz
Article No.: 20
DOI: 10.1145/2542174.2542176

We study a model of consensus decision making in which a finite group of Bayesian agents has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member of the group has a private and independent signal at his or her disposal, giving some...

Altruism in Atomic Congestion Games
Martin Hoefer, Alexander Skopalik
Article No.: 21
DOI: 10.1145/2542174.2542177

This article studies the effects of altruism, a phenomenon widely observed in practice, in the model of atomic congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a linear trade-off between selfish and social objectives. Our model can be embedded...