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The AND-OR Game

We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for two identical items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to analyze this setting for a simple, yet highly interesting, AND-OR game, where one agent is single minded and the other is unit demand. We find a mixed equilibrium of this game and show that every other equilibrium admits... (more)

On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions

We study mechanisms for the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social... (more)

Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox

We introduce a quantitative approach to comparative statics that allows to bound the maximum effect of an exogenous parameter change on a... (more)

When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue?

In second-price auctions, we find that improved targeting via enhanced information disclosure decreases revenue when there are two bidders and increases revenue if there are at least four symmetric bidders with values drawn from a distribution with a monotone hazard rate. With asymmetries, improved targeting increases revenue if the most frequent... (more)

Risk Sensitivity of Price of Anarchy under Uncertainty

In game theory, the price of anarchy framework studies efficiency loss in decentralized environments. Optimization and decision theory, on the other... (more)

A Rational Convex Program for Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets

We present a new flow-type convex program describing equilibrium solutions to linear Arrow-Debreu markets. Whereas convex formulations were previously... (more)

Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Allocation of Electric Power in Alternating Current Electric Systems for Smart Grid

Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints. The rise of... (more)

Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?

We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing connection games. In these games, a graph with designated source s and sink t is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an s-t path, knowing that the cost of each edge is shared equally between all agents using it. Two settings of... (more)

NEWS

Call for Nominations, Co-Editors-In-Chief

The term of the current co-Editors-in-Chief of the ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation is coming to an end, and the ACM Publications Board has set up a search committee to assist in selecting the next Editor-in-Chief or co-Editors-in-Chief.

TEAC started taking submissions in August 2011, and has been experiencing steady growth, with 53 submissions received in 2014 and 56 submissions in 2015 as of October 31, 2015.

Nominations, including self-nominations, are invited for a three-year term as an Editor-in-Chief beginning on July 1, 2016.

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About TEAC

The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) is a journal focusing on the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: algorithmic game theory, mechanism design, design and analysis of electronic markets, computation of equilibria, cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization, learning in games and markets, systems resilient against malicious agents, economics of computational advertising, paid search auctions, agents in networks, electronic commerce, computational social choice, recommendation/reputation/trust systems, and privacy.

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Mechanism Design for Fair Division: Allocating Divisible Items without Payments

We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing the agents to be truthful in reporting their valuations. For the very large class of homogeneous valuations, we design a truthful mechanism that provides {\em every agent} with at least a $1/e\approx 0.368$ fraction of her Proportionally Fair valuation. To complement this result, we show that no truthful mechanism can guarantee more than a $0.5$ fraction, even for the restricted class of additive linear valuations. We also propose another mechanism for additive linear valuations that works really well when every item is highly demanded. To guarantee truthfulness, our mechanisms discard a carefully chosen fraction of the allocated resources; we conclude by uncovering interesting connections between our mechanisms and known mechanisms that use money instead.

Affine Maximizers in Domains with Selfish Valuations

We consider the domain of selfish and continuous preferences over a ``rich'' allocation space and show that onto, strategyproof and allocation non-bossy social choice functions are affine maximizers. Roberts (1979) proves this result for a finite set of alternatives and an unrestricted valuation space. In this paper, we show that in a sub-domain of the unrestricted valuations with the additional assumption of allocation non-bossiness, using the richness of the allocations, the strategyproof social choice functions can be shown to be affine maximizers. We provide an example to show that allocation non-bossiness is indeed critical for this result. This work shows that an affine maximizer result needs certain amount of richness split across valuations and allocations.


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Bibliometrics

Publication Years 2013-2016
Publication Count 99
Citation Count 121
Available for Download 99
Downloads (6 weeks) 622
Downloads (12 Months) 4743
Downloads (cumulative) 14500
Average downloads per article 146
Average citations per article 1
First Name Last Name Award
Vincent Conitzer ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award
Honorable Mention (2007) ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award
Honorable Mention (2007)
Jon Kleinberg ACM AAAI Allen Newell Award (2014)
ACM Prize in Computing (2008)
Silvio Micali ACM A. M. Turing Award (2012)
Noam Nissan ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award
Series Winner (1990) ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award
Series Winner (1990)
David M Pennock ACM Senior Member (2006)
Tim Roughgarden ACM Grace Murray Hopper Award (2009)
ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award
Honorable Mention (2002)
Moshe Tennenholtz ACM AAAI Allen Newell Award (2012)
Salil P Vadhan ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award (2000)

First Name Last Name Paper Counts
Randolph McAfee 5
Tim Roughgarden 5
Ian Kash 4
Monika Henzinger 3
Yishay Mansour 3
Robert Kleinberg 3
Avinatan Hassidim 3
Ariel Procaccia 3
Martin Hoefer 3
David Parkes 3
Paul Dütting 3
Moshe Tennenholtz 3
Martin Starnberger 2
Sergei Vassilvitskii 2
Anna Karlin 2
Tüomas Sandholm 2
Alexander Skopalik 2
Nima Haghpanah 2
Abraham Othman 2
Nikhil Devanur 2
Yair Dombb 2
Christos, Papadimitriou 2
Martin Gairing 2
Nisarg Shah 2
Moshe Babaioff 2
Nicole Immorlica 2
Yonatan Aumann 2
Rann Smorodinsky 2
Paul Goldberg 2
Vahab Mirrokni 2
David Easley 2
Balasubramanian Sivan 2
Michal Feldman 2
Thomas Keßelheim 2
Georgios Piliouras 2
George Christodoulou 2
Aaron Roth 2
Maria Balcan 2
Yiling Chen 2
Nicholas Jennings 2
Asuman Ozdaglar 2
Dimitris Fotakis 2
Arpita Ghosh 2
Rahul Savani 2
Davide Bilò 1
Luciano Gualà 1
Rolf Niedermeier 1
Marina Epelman 1
Drew Fudenberg 1
Orna Agmon Ben-Yehuda 1
Assaf Schuster 1
Daron Acemoğlu 1
Yuval Emek 1
Evdokia Nikolova 1
Siddharth Suri 1
Brendan Lucier 1
Azarakhsh Malekian 1
Nadia Fawaz 1
Aparna Das 1
Silvio Micali 1
Bem Roberts 1
Peter Key 1
Zhiyi Huang 1
Qiqi Yan 1
Berthold Vöcking 1
Nick Gravin 1
Alon Rosen 1
Maria Polukarov 1
Atsushi Iwasaki 1
Makoto Yokoo 1
Stefano Leonardi 1
Hadi Minooei 1
MohammadHossein Bateni 1
Aviad Rubinstein 1
Yu Zhang 1
Moshe Tennenholtz 1
Rakefet Rozen 1
Tobias Harks 1
Mallesh Pai 1
Rob Van Stee 1
Ofir Geri 1
Guido Schäfer 1
Agata Chrobak 1
Tomasz Michalak 1
Kamesh Munagala 1
Bo Tang 1
Ruggiero Cavallo 1
Peter Troyan 1
Siddharth Barman 1
Arunava Sen 1
Konstantinos Kollias 1
Dan Tsafrir 1
Omer Tamuz 1
Felix Brandt 1
Arpita Ghosh 1
Haim Kaplan 1
Majid Khonji 1
Carola Doerr 1
Ioannis Giotis 1
Scott Kominers 1
Talal Rahwan 1
Ioannis Caragiannis 1
Nitish Korula 1
Éva Tardos 1
Jason Hartline 1
Moran Feldman 1
Eric Friedman 1
Guido Proietti 1
Shaili Jain 1
Ingmar Weber 1
Jiehua Chen 1
Gleb Polevoy 1
Laurens Cherchye 1
Mihaela Schaar 1
Stanko Dimitrov 1
Muli Ben-Yehuda 1
Daniel Reeves 1
David Sarne 1
Iftah Gamzu 1
Deepayan Chakrabarti 1
Jugal Garg 1
László Végh 1
Yiling Chen 1
Chikin Chau 1
Khaled Elbassioni 1
Benjamin Doerr 1
Aravind Srinivasan 1
Stratis Ioannidis 1
Dinan Gunawardena 1
Salil Vadhan 1
Ozan Candogan 1
Jennifer Vaughan 1
Bach Ha 1
Shaddin Dughmi 1
Felix Fischer 1
Vincent Conitzer 1
Suguru Ueda 1
Robert Bredereck 1
Yakov Babichenko 1
David Pennock 1
Yishay Mansour 1
Ercan Yildiz 1
Markus Brill 1
Erik Vee 1
Michael Schwarz 1
Bart Keijzer 1
Christos Tzamos 1
Michael Wooldridge 1
Lawrence Blume 1
Yuval Peres 1
Okke Schrijvers 1
Mohammad Mahdian 1
Ronen Gradwohl 1
Victor Naroditskiy 1
Daniel Fragiadakis 1
Stefan Kratsch 1
Gerhard Woeginger 1
Mihaela Van Der Schaar 1
Stefan Eilts 1
Bart Smeulders 1
Bram De Rock 1
Chaitanya Swamy 1
Yuanzhang Xiao 1
Jaeok Park 1
Swaprava Nath 1
Shai Vardi 1
John Fearnley 1
Elchanan Mossel 1
Anna Scaglione 1
Victor Shnayder 1
Weidong Ma 1
Pranav Dandekar 1
Matthew Cary 1
Kurtis Heimerl 1
Pablo Azar 1
Poan Chen 1
Simina Brânzei 1
Stephen Chong 1
Jon Kleinberg 1
Pablo Parrilo 1
Aleksandrs Slivkins 1
Noam Livne 1
Susanne Albers 1
Frits Spieksma 1
Alexander Peysakhovich 1
Amin Saberi 1
Sam Ganzfried 1
Noam Nisan 1
Mike Ruberry 1
Xujin Chen 1
Allan Borodin 1
Saeed Alaei 1
David Kempe 1
Sara Krehbiel 1
Jinwoo Shin 1
Kshipra Bhawalkar 1
Tal Moran 1
Jacob Abernethy 1
George Pierrakos 1
Annamária Kovács 1
Alkmini Sgouritsa 1
Pichayut Jirapinyo 1
Ioannis Caragiannis 1
Joeseph Halpern 1
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi 1
Noga Alon 1
Eyal Even-Dar 1
Liam Roditty 1
Emmanouil Zampetakis 1
Morteza Zadimoghaddam 1
Rahul Sami 1
Avrim Blum 1
Renato PaesLeme 1
Christopher Wilkens 1
Mohammad Mahdian 1
Patrick Hummel 1
Philipp Von Falkenhausen 1
Jeff Shamma 1
Jonathan Ullman 1
Daniel Goldstein 1
Xiaodong Hu 1
Benjamin Edelman 1
Claire Mathieu 1
Piotr Szczepański 1
Inbal Talgam-Cohen 1
Cam Nguyen 1
Elias Koutsoupias 1
Benjamin Lubin 1
John Lai 1
Angelo Fanelli 1

Affiliation Paper Counts
Universite Libre de Bruxelles 1
Ecole Normale Superieure 1
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1
Humboldt University of Berlin 1
University of Michigan 1
Warsaw University of Technology 1
Yale University 1
Universite Paris 7- Denis Diderot 1
The University of Hong Kong 1
Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya 1
CNRS Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 1
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 1
University of Sassari 1
Le Moyne College 1
Center for Mathematics and Computer Science - Amsterdam 1
National Chiao Tung University Taiwan 1
The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya 1
University of California, Davis 1
University of Augsburg 1
RWTH Aachen University 1
University of Toronto 1
Yonsei University 1
University of L'Aquila 1
Harvard Business School 1
Boston University 1
Technical University of Munich 1
Texas A and M University 1
University of Virginia 1
University of Freiburg 1
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich 1
University of Roma Tor Vergata 1
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Lausanne 1
University of Athens 1
University of Aarhus 1
Columbia University 1
TECH Lab 1
University of Cambridge 1
Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology 1
University of Wisconsin Madison 1
University of Electro-Communications 1
Eindhoven University of Technology 1
Yahoo Inc. 1
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology 1
Singapore University of Technology and Design 1
Qatar Computing Research institute 1
University of Roma La Sapienza 2
Weizmann Institute of Science Israel 2
Microsoft Research Cambridge 2
Yahoo Research Labs 2
University of Warsaw 2
University of Texas at Austin 2
University of Paderborn 2
University of Patras 2
University of Southern California 2
Duke University 2
Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi Centre) 2
Kyushu University 2
National Technical University of Athens 2
California Institute of Technology 2
Chinese Academy of Sciences 3
University of Waterloo 3
Catholic University of Leuven 3
Microsoft 3
London School of Economics and Political Science 3
University of Maryland 3
University of Oxford 3
Georgia Institute of Technology 4
University of Washington 4
Masdar Institute of Science and Technology 4
University of Southampton 4
Technical University of Berlin 5
Northwestern University 5
University of Pennsylvania 5
University of California, Los Angeles 5
University of Vienna 5
Max Planck Institute for Informatics 7
University of California, Berkeley 8
Technion - Israel Institute of Technology 8
Google Inc. 9
Bar-Ilan University 9
Tel Aviv University 9
University of Liverpool 10
Carnegie Mellon University 10
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 10
Cornell University 12
Stanford University 12
Harvard University 15
Microsoft Research 24
 
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