ACM Transactions on

Economics and Computation (TEAC)

Latest Articles

Introduction to the Special Issue on WINE'13


Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods

We study the design of revenue-maximizing mechanisms for selling nonexcludable public goods. In particular, we study revenue-maximizing mechanisms in Bayesian settings for facility location problems on graphs where no agent can be excluded from using a facility that has been constructed. We show that the pointwise optimization problem involved in... (more)

Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players

We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian... (more)

Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design

In this work, we investigate the reasons that make symmetric partial verification essentially useless in virtually all domains. Departing from... (more)

Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games

Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical... (more)

Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium

We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In this model, we establish that in order to compute a correlated equilibrium, any deterministic algorithm must... (more)

The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces

The cake-cutting setting, in which a single heterogeneous good must be divided between multiple parties with different tastes, is a classic model for... (more)

Subsidized Prediction Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Agents

In this article, we study the design and characterization of sequential prediction mechanisms in the presence of agents with unknown risk aversion. We... (more)

Socially-Optimal Design of Service Exchange Platforms with Imperfect Monitoring

We study the design of service exchange platforms in which long-lived anonymous users exchange services with each other. The users are randomly and... (more)

Affine Maximizers in Domains with Selfish Valuations

We consider the domain of selfish and continuous preferences over a “rich” allocation space and show that onto, strategyproof and... (more)


About TEAC

The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) is a journal focusing on the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: algorithmic game theory, mechanism design, design and analysis of electronic markets, computation of equilibria, cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization, learning in games and markets, systems resilient against malicious agents, economics of computational advertising, paid search auctions, agents in networks, electronic commerce, computational social choice, recommendation/reputation/trust systems, and privacy.

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